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Abstract
I develop a dynamic investment game with a “memoryless” R&D process in
which an incumbent and an entrant can invest in a new technology, and the
entrant can also invest in the old technology. I show that an increase in the
probability of successfully implementing a technology can cause the incumbent
to reduce its investment. Under certain conditions, if the success probability
is high, the incumbent allows the entrant to win the new technology so that
firms reach an equilibrium in which they use different technologies, and threats
of retaliation prevent attacks; but if the success probability is low, such an
equilibrium cannot be sustained, and both firms eventually implement both
technologies.
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Introduction

When a new entrant attacks an incumbent, the incumbent typically has many
advantages such as established retail locations and expertise in current technology.
The entrant might then try to develop its own advantages, for example, by investing
in a new distribution channel such as the Internet, a new technology, or a lower-cost
business model. The incumbent must then decide how to respond to this threat.
Firms facing this problem have used a variety of entry-response strategies. For
example, following E-trade’s early success with online trading technology, Charles
Schwab invested in its own online trading platform. Now both firms offer online
trading. By contrast, when BestBridalPrices.com launched an online wedding dress
store, many traditional wedding shops such as Priscilla of Boston decided to stay
focused on their traditional business and not to sell dresses online. Other approaches
include delayed response or responding only if the entrant directly attacks the
incumbent’s traditional business. For example, after EasyJet’s entry as a “no frills”
airline, British Airways initially continued to focus on the traditional full-service
format; however, when EasyJet began moving upscale and serving more business
passengers, British Airways retaliated by adopting a “no frills” model for some of its
short-haul European routes.
This paper develops a dynamic investment model that derives conditions in which
these various entry-response strategies are optimal. The model assumes an incumbent
with expertise in an old business “format” faces competition from a new entrant. Both
firms can invest in a new business “format,” which might represent a new technology
or, more generally, a new business approach, which is now possible due to exogenous
technological progress or changes in customer preferences. Either firm can potentially
use both formats; for example, they can distribute a product through traditional retail
stores and over the Internet.
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A firm has some random probability of successfully implementing a format in
which it makes positive investment. If a firm fails to implement a format in a given
period, it can try again in the following period. For example, an airline trying to
adopt a lower-cost business model might need to renegotiate contracts with its union
and train employees to spend less time handling each customer complaint. If these
negotiations and organizational changes fail one year, the airline can try them again
the next year.
Although many factors could affect firms’ investment decisions, I focus on three
key parameters. The first is the strength of preemption effects, which tend to prevent
a firm from investing in a format its competitor is already using. I operationalize this
parameter by allowing customers to have uniformly distributed brand preferences;
when brand preferences are weak, if two firms use the same format, intense price
competition ensues and profits generated from that format are low.

Therefore,

preemption effects are strong; that is, once one firm has implemented a format, the
other firm has little incentive to do so.
The second key parameter is the strength of cannibalization effects across formats.
I operationalize this parameter by allowing for three groups of customers: those who
consider only the old format, those who consider only the new format, and those who
consider both formats. If the number of customers who will consider both formats
is large, a firm that is already using one format has little incentive to implement
a second format, because doing so would mostly cannibalize sales from its existing
format rather than attracting new customers.
The third key parameter is the probability that a firm that invests in a format
will successfully implement this format at an operational or organizational level. In
some cases, implementing a new format is fairly straightforward, and firms that make
the necessary investments are almost certain to implement the format successfully;
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in other cases, even a firm that makes substantial investments in a format might fail
to implement it. I use a general functional form for success probability that makes
exploring both cases possible.
I show that interesting interactions occur among these three parameters. In
particular, when preemption and cannibalization effects are strong, an increase in
success probability causes the incumbent to invest more in the new format in an
attempt to deter the entrant from investing. This result is consistent with previous
theoretical research on innovation (Gilbert and Newbery 1982; Reinganum 1983).
More surprisingly, when preemption and cannibalization effects are weak, an increase
in success probability causes the incumbent to invest less in the new format to avoid
the threat that the entrant will retaliate by investing in the old format. Thus, I show
that an increase in the ease (or expected speed) with which firms can implement
formats might discourage the incumbent’s investment in the new format.
As an illustrative example, consider the contrast between the airline industry and
the package-shipping industry. For a traditional full-service airline, implementing
a no-frills format (or for a no-frills airline, implementing a full-service format) is
a major organizational challenge, requiring firms to invest in retraining employees,
renegotiating union contracts, and developing new pricing skills, all of which have
a fairly high chance of failure (Sanchez 1994; Dutta et al. 2003). By contrast, in
the package-shipping industry, for primarily ground-based carrier UPS to acquire
more airplanes (or for primarily air-based carrier FedEx to acquire more trucks) is a
more straightforward investment, because both firms have the logistical expertise to
manage both ground and air shipping (Composit 2004).
We might expect the difficulty of implementing new formats would compel airlines
to stay focused, whereas the ease of implementing new formats would compel packageshipping firms to diversify, but in fact the opposite has occurred. Over time, tradi-
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tional airlines have improved aircraft turnaround times, renegotiated labor contracts,
and stopped offering free meals and free checked bags, while the no-frills airlines have
added additional routes, improved customer service, and started offering optional
services such as early boarding to attract business passengers. The two types of
airlines have become similar, with both offering an efficient “no-frills” level of service,
and better service at a higher price (Cowell 2002; McCartney 2011; Jacobs 2013).
By contrast, UPS and FedEx remain more differentiated, with UPS focusing heavily
on ground transportation and FedEx focusing heavily on air transportation (Darell
2011).
Of course, competitive outcomes in these industries depend on many complex
forces beyond those in this paper’s theoretical model.

Nonetheless, this model

provides one potential explanation for why traditional airline incumbents (faced with
the threat from no-frills airlines) have invested continuously in the difficult task
of developing low-cost no-frills expertise, whereas package-shipping incumbent UPS
(faced with the threat from FedEx) has largely avoided the easier task of expanding
its air-shipping service.
Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 presents the formal model and
results. Section 4 presents two model extensions that study asymmetric formats.
Section 5 concludes. A supplemental online appendix contains all proofs.

2

Related Literature

Previous theoretical literature in economics and marketing has studied optimal
defensive strategies (Schmalensee 1978; Hauser and Shugan 1983; Reinganum 1983;
Fudenberg and Tirole 1984; Katz and Shapiro 1987; Purohit 1994; Kalra, Rajiv, and
Srinivasan 1998; Balasubramanian 1998) and entry strategies (Gelman and Salop
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1983; Carpenter and Nakamoto 1990; Narasimhan and Zhang 2000; Joshi, Reibstein,
and Zhang 2011). The current paper contributes to this literature by incorporating
competition between an entrant and an incumbent into a dynamic investment game
in which firms make repeated investments over a theoretically infinite number of time
periods. Because successful investment can lead to a series of reactions and counterreactions, this model generates new insights into how threats of strategic retaliation
influence investment behavior.
Previous theoretical research has also shown that multi-market contact in a
repeated game can help firms sustain high prices (Bernheim and Whinston 1990)
or sustain an arrangement in which they focus on different markets (Karnani and
Wernerfelt 1985; Bronnenberg 2008). The current paper differs in two key respects.
First, I show how preemption effects, cannibalization effects, and the difficulty of
implementing a format interact to determine whether firms can sustain an equilibrium
in which they stay focused on different formats. Second, I show that multi-format
contact can create an asymmetry in the investment incentives of an incumbent and
an entrant; for example, in some cases, the entrant invests heavily in the new format,
whereas the incumbent invests nothing.
Another related stream of research has developed dynamic investment models
involving increasing returns (Athey and Schmutzler 2001; Rob and Fishman 2005),
which implies that firms invest more in areas of current strength than in areas of
current weakness (Selove 2010). By contrast, the current paper does not involve
increasing returns. Instead, concerns over cannibalization and competitive retaliation
sometimes compel firms to stay focused.
Empirical literature has studied factors that determine whether incumbents invest
in new technologies (e.g., Christensen 1997; Chandy and Tellis 1998, 2000; Debruyne
and Reibstein 2005) or lower-cost business formats (e.g., Ritson 2009). These papers
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have identified concerns over cannibalization and preemption as key factors that
determine whether firms adopt new technologies, and whether defensive strategies
are successful. This paper uses a formal game-theoretic model to clarify how these
factors determine firms’ optimal investment strategies.

3

Model

Assume two firms, indexed by i ∈ {A, B}, can compete using two possible business
formats, indexed by j ∈ {1, 2}. At any time t, the formats used by each firm are
given by Xt = (XA,1,t , XA,2,t ; XB,1,t , XB,2,t ), where

Xi,j,t =




1 if firm i uses format j at time t


0 otherwise

The game begins in state (1, 0; 0, 0), with firm A (the incumbent) using only
format 1, and firm B (the entrant) not using either format. Assume firms cannot exit
a format (or equivalently, exit costs are sufficiently high), so that once a firm starts
using a format, it always continues to do so. If firm i did not use format j at time
t − 1, the probability that it will successfully implement (and begin using) this format
at time t is the following (as long as this function is not greater than one):

F (ei,j,t ) =

z
ln(dei,j,t + 1)
d

(1)

where z > 0, d > 0, and ei,j,t is the amount firm i invests in format j at time t. This
success function is memoryless in the sense that past failed investments have no effect
on the current state.
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Taking the first derivative, we have:

F 0 (ei,j,t ) =

z
dei,j,t + 1

(2)

Note that F 0 (0) = z, and the parameter d determines how rapidly the marginal value
of investment decreases.
Figure 1. Investment Success Function Examples

Figure 1 gives examples of this investment success function for two different sets
of parameter values. For both examples, z = 0.1, so the marginal impact of the
first dollar invested is the same. However, for the first example, d = 0.1, meaning
each additional dollar invested continues to have a large impact on the probability of
success, whereas for the second example, d = 0.9, meaning the marginal impact of
each additional dollar rapidly decreases. A key point of this paper is to explore how
these two different types of success functions affect the equilibrium outcome of the
game.
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I assume a firm cannot simultaneously invest in both formats in a given period.1 I
also assume firms alternate their investments, so firm A invests only in odd-numbered
periods and firm B invests only in even-numbered periods.2 These assumptions
simplify the analysis by ensuring only one state variable can change in any given
period.
A
B
Let π(X
and π(X
represent firm A’s and firm B’s profits, respectively, as a
t)
t)

function of the current state Xt . Each firm has discount factor δ and maximizes
expected discounted profits. Firm A’s objective is to maximize:
∞


X
A
δ t π(X
−
e
−
e
E
A,1,t
A,2,t
t)

"

#
(3)

t=0

Firm B has an analogous objective function. I assume firms play a Markov perfect
equilibrium (MPE) of this dynamic investment game.
In principle, we could make the model more realistic by relaxing some of these
assumptions. For example, we could allow firms to exit formats, and similar results
would still hold if we also restricted the profit functions in such a way that exit
is never optimal.3 We could also allow for multiple discrete states of success (and
“partially-successful” investment) or allow for simultaneous investment by both firms
in both formats. Such changes would complicate the analysis technically, but the
same basic forces described in section 3.3 would still determine whether firms can
sustain an equilibrium in which they stay focused on different formats.
1

Intuitively, due to limitations on managerial time and attention or other internal resource
constraints, there are often diseconomies of scope to investment during a given time period.
2
For another example of a dynamic model in which firms alternate moves, see Maskin and Tirole
(1988).
3
For the profit functions used in this paper, if there are no exit costs, and if firms reach state
(1,1;1,1), an equilibrium could exist in which they both retreat, so the game goes back to state
(1,0;0,1). After these “retreats” occur, if we assume firms can immediately re-enter any format they
have exited in the past, then neither firm would resume using both formats, because its competitor
could immediately retaliate by doing the same. The assumption that firms cannot exit a format is a
simple way to rule out this type of equilibrium. Alternatively, we could modify the profit functions
so mutual retreat decreases profits, or we could assume firms face exist costs.
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However, one key assumption cannot be relaxed. The restriction to Markov
strategies implies that a firm can retaliate only in response to a change in the game’s
state; that is, a firm can react to its competitor’s successful investment, but cannot
react to failed investment. In fact, Proposition 1 depends on the possibility that
each firm could have a long string of investment failures without facing retaliation for
these failed investments. This assumption is reasonable if companies can keep their
investments secret until they reach some level of technical or operational success. For
example, the technology firm Apple is famous for keeping its new product strategies
secret, preventing competitive reaction, until it is ready for product launch (Lashinsky
2012).
If each firm can observe and react to its competitor’s failed investments, Proposition 1 does not hold. However, Proposition 2 still holds; and the equilibria described
in Propositions 3, 4, and 5 still exist. More generally, allowing firms to react to failed
investments would not rule out any of the equilibria identified in this paper; it would,
however, permit additional equilibrium outcomes.4

3.1

Product market competition

I now introduce a model of product market competition that gives rise to a profit
function for each firm at each possible state.
Assume a unit mass of customers vary along two dimensions. First, their brand
preferences are represented by a Hotelling line with length 1 and per-unit transportation cost β. Firm A is fixed at the left side of the line and firm B is fixed at the right
side.5 Customers also vary in their format preferences. A fraction α will buy only
4

Allowing firms to react to failed investments implies permitting all subgame perfect equilibria,
which contains the set of Markov perfect equilibria considered here (see Maskin and Tirole 1988).
Note that Proposition 1 states conditions in which both firms implement both formats in all
equilibria; allowing for additional equilibria can overturn this result. By contrast, Proposition 2
states only that a particular equilibrium exists.
5
Other theoretical papers have also assumed firms are exogenously located at opposite sides of a
Hotelling line in order to focus on other firm decisions (e.g., Simester 1995; Ellison 2005).
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using format 1, another α will buy only using format 2, and the remaining 1 − 2α are
indifferent between the two formats, where α ∈ [0, 21 ]. One can think of customers
who will use only the new format as having a latent preference they do not realize
until at least one firm implements the new format, at which point these customers
enter the market.
In each period, a customer buys at most one product. Suppose a customer is
located a distance ψ from the left side of the line. If this customer has either a
preference for format 1 or no format preference, he derives utility V − βψ − PA,1 if he
purchases from firm A using format 1 at price PA,1 . However, if he has a preference
for format 2, he derives utility −∞ from any transaction using format 1. The utility
of purchasing from firm B or with format 2 can be computed in a similar manner.
Without loss of generality, assume marginal production costs are zero. Throughout the paper, I also assume:
Assumption 1.

2β < V < 2β



1−α
1−2α



This assumption ensures the market is covered in equilibrium and that, when firms
use different formats (at state (1, 0; 0, 1)), they each set the monopoly price.6
Given this set-up, the online appendix proves that an equilibrium exists in which
prices are as follows. If a firm is the only one that uses a format, it sets price V − β
in that format; if both firms use a format, they each set price β in that format.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 guarantees each format has enough loyal customers that
a firm sets the monopoly price whenever it is the only one to use a format; on the
other hand, firms set the standard competitive price from the Hotelling model in any
format used by both firms. Table 1 reports equilibrium profits for each firm in each
possible state.
6

If the second inequality in Assumption 1 did not hold, in some cases, state (1, 0; 0, 1) would have
a pure strategy price equilibrium in which firms set prices below the monopoly level, and in other
cases, this state would have a mixed strategy price equilibrium in which firms randomize over prices.
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Table 1. Equilibrium Profits at Each State
State

Firm A’s profits

Firm B’s profits

(1, 0; 0, 0)

(V − β)(1 − α)

0

(1, 1; 0, 0)

(V − β)

0

(1, 0; 0, 1)

(V − β) 12

(V − β) 21

(1, 0; 1, 0)

β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

(1, 1; 0, 1)

(V − β)α + β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

(1, 1; 1, 0)

(V − β)α + β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

(1, 0; 1, 1)

β(1 − α) 12

(V − β)α + β(1 − α) 12

(1, 1; 1, 1)

β 12

β 12

The profits in Table 1 arise from the one-shot equilibrium of the pricing game.
Note this equilibrium does allow for competitive price reaction when a firm implements a new format. For example, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), the firms are using different
formats, and both firms set the monopoly price. If the incumbent then implements
the new format, so the state moves to (1, 1; 0, 1), the entrant immediately cuts its
price. This threat of immediate price retaliation helps discourage the incumbent
from making this investment. On the other hand, if we allowed collusive pricing at all
states, this could remove the threat of price retaliation and encourage firms to attack
each other’s format. More generally, we could allow firms to price collusively at some
states and competitively at others, which would encourage investment behavior that
leads to the states with collusive pricing. However, I leave the topic of collusive pricing
for future research; the current paper focuses on the one-shot price equilibrium.
To summarize, this model captures two key aspects of multi-format competition.
First, new formats vary in the degree to which they expand the market as opposed to
cannibalizing from the old format (which is determined in this model by α). Second,
formats vary in the degree to which they can support multiple profitable firms (which
is determined in this model by β). One could also use more realistic and complicated
12

models of product market competition, for example, with asymmetries between firms
and formats. Section 4 gives examples of how such asymmetries can affect dynamic
investment competition.
Table 2. Variables in the Model
i ∈ {A, B}

Index of firms

j ∈ {1, 2}

Index of formats

t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}
Xi,j,t ∈ {0, 1}
ei,j,t

Indicator of whether firm i uses format j at time t
Firm i’s investment in format j at time t

F

Function that maps investment into success probability

z

Rate of increase in success probability for first dollar invested

d

Determines how rapidly the marginal impact of investment decreases

δ

Each firm’s discount factor

B
A
, π(X
π(X
t)
t)

3.2

Index of time

General profit functions for each firm

V

Value of the product to a customer who is zero distance from the firm

α

Fraction of customers loyal to each format

β

Length of Hotelling line

Equilibrium existence

The online appendix proves the following lemma.
Lemma 1. A pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium exists.
This result holds for any z > 0, d > 0, and any V , α, and β satisfying Assumption 1.
Lemma 1 does not guarantee equilibrium uniqueness. For example, in some cases,
there is an MPE in which both firms invest nothing at state (1, 0; 0, 1), and another
MPE in which both firms make positive investment at this state. The following
section derives conditions in which firms can (or cannot) sustain an equilibrium with
no investment at this state.
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3.3

Weak preemption and cannibalization effects

I first explore the case in which preemption and cannibalization effects are relatively
weak (α and β are large). I show that when the success probability is high, there
is an equilibrium in which the incumbent allows the entrant to win the new format,
and firms then perpetually use different formats. However, if the success probability
is low, such an equilibrium does not exist, and both firms eventually implement both
formats. The results in this section are the key new insights of the paper.
Define a state as “absorbing” if neither firm invests once that state is reached.
Based on the set-up of the game, state (1,1;1,1) is obviously absorbing. We can then
use backward induction to find equilibrium investment levels for all other states.
Consider what happens at state (1, 0; 1, 1). At this state, as the incumbent decides
whether to invest in the new format, it faces both the problem of cannibalizing its
existing sales and the problem of potentially entering a format that the entrant is
already using. If the following condition holds, neither of these effects is strong
enough to stop the incumbent from investing at this state:



1
αβ
1
>
1−δ 2
z

(4)

This condition ensures the discounted gains from entering the new format are enough
to justify investing the first marginal dollar. In this case, state (1, 0; 1, 1) is not
absorbing, because the incumbent makes positive investment at this state, and
therefore the game will eventually move to state (1, 1; 1, 1).
Table 1 implies that the smallest incremental profits from adding a new format
occur when Firm A (for example) implements format 2 and moves the state from
(1, 0; 0, 1) to (1, 1; 0, 1). Generating these incremental profits over an infinite number
of periods would be enough to justify the first marginal dollar of investment if the
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following condition holds:7
Condition 1.


1
1−δ



 1
 1
αβ 
− V − 2β
−α >
2
2
z

When this condition holds, any state at which one firm (but not the other) is using
both formats cannot be absorbing, because the other firm would always make positive
investment until it also implements both formats.
On the other hand, state (1, 0; 0, 1) could be absorbing. At this state, each
firm must worry that implementing another format will lead to retaliation by its
competitor. For example, if firm A implements the new format, its profits will
temporarily increase; however, once firm B successfully retaliates, the game moves
to state (1, 1; 1; 1), at which point increased competition in each format causes
firm A’s profits to drop below their initial level. This threat of retaliation can
prevent investment at state (1, 0; 0, 1) if and only if the following inequality holds
(for notational convenience, this condition is stated in terms of the general profit
function π A ):




 

A
A
π(1,1;0,1)
1 + δ(1 − F (e∗ )) + [δ/(1 − δ)]F (e∗ )π(1,1;1,1)
1
1
A
(5)
−
π
≤
(1,0;0,1)
1 − δ 2 (1 − F (e∗ ))
1−δ
z

where e∗ denotes firm B’s optimal investment level in the old format at state
(1, 1; 0, 1). The first term on the left side of this inequality represents the expected
discounted profits to firm A just after reaching state (1, 1; 0, 1), accounting for firm
B’s eventual retaliation; the second term represents the expected discounted profits
to firm A of staying permanently at state (1, 0; 0, 1).
Whether this inequality holds depends on how quickly Firm B is expected to
Moving from state (1, 0; 0, 1) to state (1, 1; 0, 1) allows the incumbent tocapture an additional α2
customers, who each pay price β. However, it also causes a fraction 21 − α of the firm’s customers
to move from format 1, at which they paid price V − β, to format 2, at which they pay the lower
price β.
7
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retaliate following a successful attack by Firm A. If the parameter d is very large,
each additional dollar spent has a rapidly decreasing effect on the probability of
success, so once state (1, 1; 0, 1) is reached, in each period Firm B will simply make a
small “exploratory” investment that gives it a small chance of success. On the other
hand, if d is small, each incremental dollar continues to have a large effect on the
success probability, so Firm B will invest enough to give it a large chance of success
in any given period.
Formally, as d → ∞, F (e∗ ) → 0, which implies that the expected time required
for successful retaliation grows without bound, and the left side of inequality (5)

1
A
A
. When we insert the values from Table 1, this
− π(1,0;0,1)
approaches 1−δ
π(1,1;0,1)
expression is the same as the left side of Condition 1, which implies (5) does not hold,
and the threat of retaliation cannot prevent investment at state (1, 0; 0, 1).
Intuitively, when implementing a format is sufficiently difficult (d is sufficiently
large), the expected time required to retaliate becomes so long that firms do not worry
about retaliation. Rather, they each invest a small amount in the other’s format
because Condition 1 guarantees that the expected discounted profits of a successful
attack are enough to justify investing the first marginal dollar. Although each firm’s
expected success probability in any given period is low, one firm eventually succeeds
in its attack, and its competitor eventually succeeds in retaliating, and so both firms
end up using both formats. The online appendix proves this result formally.
Proposition 1. If Condition 1 holds and d is sufficiently large, then in any equilibrium, both firms implement both formats in the long run (with probability one).
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Figure 2. When implementing a format is difficult (d is large), both firms
implement both formats. (Arrows indicate possible paths the game state
can follow.)

I now consider the case in which implementing a format is easy. When d is
sufficiently small, F (e∗ ) = 1, and retaliatory investments are guaranteed to succeed
in the next period after an attack. Inequality (5) then becomes

A
π(1,1;0,1)

−

A
π(1,0;0,1)




−

δ
1−δ



 1
A
A
π(1,0;0,1)
− π(1,1;1,1)
≤
z

(6)

Thus, unless firms have very low discount factors, inequality (5) holds when d is
sufficiently small, in which case the threat of immediate retaliation can prevent
investment at state (1, 0; 0, 1).
The following condition is sufficient to ensure (6) holds. This condition also
ensures that if d is small enough, an equilibrium exists in which the incumbent invests
nothing at the initial state (1, 0; 0, 0), guaranteeing that the industry reaches the
absorbing state (1, 0; 0, 1).
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Condition 2.

αV −

δ3
1−δ



V − 2β
2


<

1
z

The first term on the left side of this condition is an upper bound on the shortterm benefits the incumbent gains from implementing the new format (moving the
game from state (1, 0; 0, 0) to state (1, 1; 0, 0)), and the second term is the cost of
provoking the entrant to implement both formats (given that d is small enough that
the entrant will immediately implement any format in which it invests). Condition
2 ensures that, at the initial state, the sum of these two effects is not great enough
to justify the incumbent investing the first marginal dollar in the new format.8 Note
that Conditions 1 and 2 are both more likely to hold when δ is large. By choosing δ
sufficiently close to one, it is straightforward to find parameter values for which both
conditions hold.
The online appendix proves the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If Conditions 1 and 2 hold, and d is sufficiently small, there is an
equilibrium in which firm B is the only one that invests in the new format; once it
successfully implements this format, neither firm makes further investment.
Note that if either firm ever implements both formats, the other firm keeps
investing until it also implements both formats. For example, at state (1, 1; 0, 1),
the entrant invests in the old format, knowing the incumbent has no way to retaliate.
On the other hand, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), the entrant does not invest in the old format
because the incumbent would then retaliate by investing in the new format. Thus,
the game progresses as follows. At the initial state (1, 0; 0, 0) the incumbent avoids
investing in the new format so that it retains a credible way to retaliate against the
entrant. Once the entrant implements the new format, and the game reaches state
8

This condition is somewhat stronger than necessary, but it is more notationally succinct than
the weakest possible condition would be.
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(1, 0; 0, 1), neither firm encroaches on the other’s format, because neither firm wants
to end up at state (1, 1; 1, 1).
Figure 3. When implementing a format is easy (d is small), a firm will
not implement a second format because doing so would lead to swift
retaliation. (Arrows indicate possible paths the game state can follow.)

To summarize, Proposition 1 states that when the success probability is low, both
firms must eventually implement both formats, whereas Proposition 2 states that
when the success probability is high, there is an equilibrium in which firms reach an
absorbing state where they use different formats.

3.4

Strong preemption and cannibalization effects

The previous section showed that an increase in success probability can make the
incumbent less willing to invest in the new format. The current section shows that
this effect can be reversed.
Intuitively, the previous section assumed preemption and cannibalization effects
were weak, and so the incumbent primarily faced a trade-off between the shortterm gains from adopting the new format and the long-term loss due to competitive
19

retaliation.

In that case, an increase in success probability made the threat of

retaliation more immediate, which made the incumbent less willing to invest in
the new format to increase its short-term profits. By contrast, the current section
assumes preemption and cannibalization effects are strong. In this case, an increase
in success probability makes the relative benefits of preempting the potential entrant
more immediate, which makes the incumbent more willing to cannibalize its existing
sales by investing in the new format. Because the results in this section are similar to
results from previous theoretical research on innovation (Gilbert and Newbery 1982;
Reinganum 1983), I keep the exposition of these results relatively brief.
The current section assumes the following conditions hold:
Condition 3.



1
1
(V − β)α <
1−δ
z




1
β(1 − α)
1
<
1−δ
2
z

Condition 4.

Condition 3 implies that cannibalization effects are strong (α is small), whereas
Condition 4 implies that preemption effects are strong (β is small). The online
appendix shows that these conditions guarantee all states except the initial state
are absorbing (see proof of Proposition 3).
I also assume the following condition holds:
Condition 5.

(V − β)α +


δ
V −β
1
>
1−δ
2
z

This condition is sufficient to ensure the entrant invests in the new format at the
initial state. As d → ∞, the expected time for the entrant to successfully implement
the new format grows without bound, and Condition 3 ensures the incumbent invests
nothing at the initial state due to concerns over cannibalizing its existing sales.
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On the other hand, as d → 0, the entrant is guaranteed to successfully implement
the new format the first time it moves. In this case, Condition 5 guarantees that the
incumbent also invests in the new format at the initial state. The first term in that
condition represents the incumbent’s immediate profit impact from implementing the
new format, whereas the second term reflects the long-term benefit of preventing the
entrant from implementing the new format.
The online appendix formally proves the following.
Proposition 3. If Conditions 3, 4, and 5 all hold, then all states except the initial
state are absorbing. If d is sufficiently large, then at the initial state, the incumbent
makes zero investment and the entrant is guaranteed to win the new format in the
long run. However, if d is sufficiently small, then at the initial state, both firms make
positive investment in the new format.
Figure 4. When cannibalization and preemption effects are strong and
implementing a format is difficult (d is large), the incumbent allows the
entrant to win the new format.
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Figure 5. When cannibalization and preemption effects are strong and
implementing a format is easy (d is small), the incumbent is willing to
cannibalize its sales to try to preempt investment by the entrant.

Survey data show that high-tech firms vary substantially in how much their
managers say they are willing to cannibalizes existing sales (Chandy and Tellis 1998).
When a new technology has a winner-take-all property (preemption effects are strong),
Proposition 3 implies that incumbents should be willing to cannibalize existing sales
if the probability that an entrant can quickly implement the new technology is high,
but incumbents should not be willing to cannibalize existing sales if this probability
is low.

3.5

Other regions of the parameter space

Previous sections have studied cases in which preemption and cannibalization effects
are either both weak or both strong. I do not present detailed results for other
combinations of these parameter values, because the results are more straightforward
and less interesting than those in the previous sections. If preemption effects are
weak and cannibalization effects are strong, the incumbent allows the entrant to win
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the new format; and if preemption effects are strong and cannibalization effects are
weak, the two firms race to enter the new format. These results do not depend
on the parameter d that determines how quickly the marginal impact of investment
diminishes.

4

Extensions: Asymmetric formats

Until now, I have assumed profit functions are symmetric across formats. To illustrate
how large asymmetries can change investment incentives, I now present two model
extensions. The first assumes formats differ in terms of fixed costs, and the second
assumes either firm’s use of the new format eliminates profits from the old format.

4.1

Fixed expense in the old format

Many Internet-based business models allow firms to avoid fixed expenses, such as
physical retail locations, that are associated with traditional business models. I now
show that such fixed expenses in the old format can allow the incumbent to attack
the new format without fear of retaliation.
Assume there is a recurring fixed expense f to operating the old format, which
is avoided in the new format. For example, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), firm A’s profits are




now (V − β) 12 − f , whereas firm B’s profits are still (V − β) 12 . Also assume
Condition 1 holds, so cannibalization and preemption effects alone are too weak to
prevent investment. If the fixed expense is high enough that the following condition
holds, the entrant will never invest in the old format:
Condition 6.


h
i 1
1
(V − β)α − f <
1−δ
z

The online appendix proves the following result formally.
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Proposition 4. If Conditions 1 and 6 hold, in equilibrium both firms eventually
implement the new format, but the entrant never invests in the old format.
Figure 6. Large fixed expenses in the old format allow the incumbent to
invest in the new format without fear of retaliation. (Arrows indicate
possible paths the game state can follow.)

As an example in which the incumbent could attack the new format without fear
of retaliation, when incumbent Charles Schwab invested in its online trading platform,
it would have been unprofitable for E-trade to retaliate by building a large network
bricks-and-mortar locations. Schwab now offers both online and in-person investment
formats, whereas E-trade focuses on the online format.9

4.2

Delayed entry response

Online stores often free-ride on customer service provided by traditional stores,
making traditional stores much less profitable (Anderson et al. 2009). To illustrate
how this type of asymmetric channel conflict can affect investment decisions, I make
9

According to their company websites, Schwab has over 300 physical branches, whereas E-trade
has only 30.
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the extreme assumptions that either firm’s use of the new format eliminates profits
from the old format, but either firm’s use of the old format does not affect the profits
from using the new format.10
Under these new assumptions, if implementing a format is difficult enough, at
first the incumbent avoids investing in the new format, because implementing this
format would entirely cannibalize its existing profits. However, once the entrant
finally succeeds in implementing the new format, destroying all profits in the old
format, the incumbent starts investing in the new format as well. This result is
similar in spirit to previous results by Katz and Shapiro (1987), who study whether an
incumbent or an entrant innovates first, if firms can imitate each other’s innovations.11
The online appendix proves the following proposition formally.
Proposition 5. If either firm’s use of the new format eliminates profits in the old
format, Condition 1 holds, and d is sufficiently large, then the incumbent initially
makes no investment; after the entrant successfully implements the new format, the
incumbent begins investing in the new format until it also implements this format.
As an example of delayed entry response, wedding dress shops face the potential
threat that a bride could spend several hours trying on dresses in their store and
using their customer service until she finds a dress she likes, and then buy a similar
dress online at a much lower price.12 Currently most new brides are reluctant to buy
10

In the case of free-riding, the new format might benefit from the existence of the old format. To
allow this benefit to occur, we could make the alternative assumption that use of the new format
leaves the old format just profitable enough that the incumbent will continue to use the old format.
11
Using the terminology of Katz and Shapiro (1987), the conditions of Proposition 5 imply the
entrant has stronger “stand-alone incentives” (defined as the increase in a firm’s profits if it innovates
and its competitor does nothing) than the incumbent, and firms have equal “preemption incentives”
(defined as the difference in profits from innovating first rather than second). As a result, the entrant
innovates first.
12
For example, see the blog post at http://henjofilms.com/?p=586 (“My Online Wedding Dress
Buying Experience!”), in which a recently married woman says she visited several traditional wedding
stores and found a dress she liked priced at $2,800, but instead bought a similar dress online for
$350.
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a dress online (Bertagnoli 2011), so for now the best strategy for the traditional shops
may be to stick with their current format; however, if an online retailer ever builds
a strong-enough reputation that free-riding on customer service becomes a major
problem in this market, traditional wedding shops might want to start investing in
the online channel as well.
Figure 7. If either firm’s use of the new format eliminates profits in the
old format, and implementing a format is difficult, the incumbent does
not invest in the new format until the entrant has successfully adopted
this format. (Arrows indicate possible paths the game state can follow.)

4.3

Other possible asymmetries

This section has introduced two possible types of asymmetry into the model. One
could imagine other possible asymmetries as well. For example, if the new format is
more difficult to implement than the old, the entrant might start by investing in the
old format. On the other hand, if the entrant has a weaker brand than the incumbent,
then the entrant might no longer be able to make a credible threat of attacking the
old format (undermining the equilibrium of Proposition 2), or the entrant might avoid
entering the market altogether. I leave such model extensions for future research.
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5

Conclusion

This paper has developed a model in which an incumbent and an entrant compete in a
market where a new business format has become available. If implementing a format
is difficult, firms can attack each other without worrying about swift retaliation, so
each firm continually invests a small amount in the other’s format until they both
implement both formats. By contrast, if implementing a format is easy, the incumbent
allows the entrant to win the new format, and firms can then sustain an equilibrium
in which they stay focused on different formats.
These results hold when preemption and cannibalization effects are weak. On
the other hand, when both of these effects are strong, an increase in the ease of
implementing formats makes the incumbent more willing to cannibalize its sales by
investing in the new format.
The paper includes two model extensions that illustrate how asymmetric formats
can affect investment incentives. Future research could further extend the model, for
example, to allow firms to differ in how easily they can implement new formats, or to
allow customer preferences to change over time.
Future research could also empirically investigate the predictions of the model,
looking for evidence that incumbents tend to avoid investing in new formats in
industries where all of the following hold: (1) entry barriers keep the number of
firms small; (2) conditional on entry, implementing a format is relatively easy;
and (3) multiple firms could profitably implement both formats (preemption and
cannibalization effects are weak). In such industries, this model implies incumbents
should retain the threat of implementing the new format later as a form of retaliation.
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Price Equilibrium for the Product Market Competition Model: At state
(1, 0; 0, 0), if Firm A sets price PA,1 ≤ V − β, it captures all (1 − α) customers who
will purchase using format 1. If it sets its price in the range PA,1 ∈ (V − β, V ), it
captures some positive fraction of these customers. If it sets PA,1 ≥ V , it captures no
customers. To be precise, Firm A’s profits are:



P (1 − α)
if PA,1 ≤ V − β

 A,1
h
i
A,1
πA = PA,1 (1 − α) V −P
if PA,1 ∈ (V − β, V )
β



0
if PA,1 ≥ V

(7)

Note that setting price strictly below V −β results in strictly lower profits than setting
price equal to V − β. Also, setting price above V results in zero profits. Therefore,
any optimal solution must lie in the interval [V −β, V ]. At the interior of this interval:
h V − 2P i
dπA
A,1
= (1 − α)
dPA,1
β
h 2β − V i
< (1 − α)
β

(8)

<0
where the first inequality holds because we are focusing on a price interval where
PA,1 > V − β, and the second inequality follows because Assumption 1 states V > 2β.
This derivative being negative implies that Firm A’s profits increase as its lowers its
price to the point PA,1 = V − β.
At state (1, 1; 0, 0), we first focus on the case for which PA,1 < PA,2 . As long as
both prices lie in the interval [V − β, V ], Firm A’s profits are:
hV − P i
hV − P i
A,2
A,1
+ αPA,2
πA = (1 − α)PA,1
β
β

(9)

Taking first derivatives, we have:
h V − 2P i
∂πA
A,1
= (1 − α)
∂PA,1
β

(10)

h V − 2P i
∂πA
A,2
=α
∂PA,2
β

(11)

Similar derivations to those in (8) show that both of the above terms are negative.
By symmetry, if PA,1 > PA,2 , both partial derivatives are also negative. Finally,
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if PA,1 = PA,2 , the left partial derivative (with respect to either price) is given by
(10), and the right partial derivative is given by (11). Note these derivatives are also
negative.
All of these derivatives being negative implies that, as long as prices are in the
interval [V −β, V ], the firm’s profits increase as it decreases both prices. Setting either
price strictly below V − β would decrease profit margins without increasing demand,
and setting either price above V would result in zero demand for that format, either
of which would result in lower profits. Therefore, the optimal solution is to set both
prices exactly at V − β and capture all potential customers in the market.
For state (1, 0; 0, 1), I will show there is an equilibrium in which both firms set the
monopoly price: PA,1 = PB,2 = V − β. I will show that if Firm B sets this price, then
Firm A’s best response is to set this price, and vice versa. If Firm B sets PB,2 = V −β,
then Firm A’s demand function can be broken into four intervals. In the lowest price
interval, Firm A captures all (1 − α) customers who will purchase using format 1; in
the second price interval, it captures all α of the customers who are loyal to format
1 and some positive fraction of the (1 − 2α) customers who will purchase with either
format; in the third price interval it captures some positive fraction of both of these
customer types; and in the fourth price interval it captures no customers. To be
precise, Firm A’s profits are:



PA,1 (1 − α)



i
h



PA,1 α + (1 − 2α) V −PA,1
2β
h 


i
πA =
V
−P
V −PA,1
A,1


PA,1 α
+ (1 − 2α)

β
2β



0

if PA,1 ≤ V − 2β
if PA,1 ∈ (V − 2β, V − β)

(12)

if PA,1 ∈ (V − β, V )
if PA,1 ≥ V

At the point PA,1 = V − β, the first derivative as Firm A increases its prices is:
h V − 2P i
h V − 2P i
d + πA
A,1
A,1
=α
+ (1 − 2α)
dPA,1
β
2β
h 2β − V i
h 2β − V i
=α
+ (1 − 2α)
β
2β

(13)

<0
where the inequality follows because Assumption 1 states V > 2β. This derivative
being negative implies that raising prices reduces profits. Also at the point PA,1 =
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V − β, the first derivative as Firm A decreases its prices is:
h V − 2P i
d− πA
A,1
= α + (1 − 2α)
dPA,1
2β
h 2β − V i
= α + (1 − 2α)
2β
hV i
= α + (1 − 2α) − (1 − 2α)
2β
hV i
= (1 − α) − (1 − 2α)
2β

(14)

>0
V
1−α
where the inequality holds because Assumption 1 implies 2β
< 1−2α
. This derivative
being positive implies that lowering prices also reduces profits.
Thus, we have shown that there is a local maximum at PA,1 = V − β. By
differentiating (13) and (14) with respect to PA,1 , we find that the second derivative of
πA is negative (for both increases and decreases in price), so this local optimum is also
a global optimum. By symmetry, Firm B’s best response is also to set PB,2 = V − β.
Intuitively, Assumption 1 guarantees there is an equilibrium in which both firms set
prices at the kink in the demand curve occurring at the highest price for which a firm
captures all customers loyal to its own format.
At state (1, 0; 1, 0), both firms compete for the (1 − α)
who will
 mass of customers

PB,1 −PA,1
1
purchase using format 1. Firm A’s demand is (1 − α) 2 +
, and Firm B
2β
has analogous demand. These are simply the demand functions from the standard
Hotelling model, and the standard derivations for this model show that in equilibrium
firms set prices PA,1 = PB,1 = β, and each firm captures one-half of the available
customers.
At state (1, 1; 0, 1), Firm A uses both formats, whereas Firm B uses only format
two. I will show there is an equilibrium in which PA,1 = V − β and PA,2 = PB,2 = β.
Given Firm A’s pricesin the proposed equilibrium, Firm B’s profits are
β−P
PB,2 (1−α) 12 + 2βB,2 . By differentiating with respect to price and finding first-order
conditions, it is straightforward to show that Firm B’s best response is PB,2 = β.
Given Firm B’s price in the proposed equilibrium, Firm A’s profits are:

πA = αPA,1

hV − P i
h1 β − P i
h
ci
A,1
A,2
cA 1 + β − PA
+ αPA,2 +
+ (1 − 2α)P
β
2
2β
2
2β
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(15)

cA ≡ min{PA,1 , PA,2 }. The three terms on the right side of this equation
where P
represent Firm A’s profits from customers who will only use format 1, those who will
only use format 2, and those who will use either format, respectively. For notational
simplicity, I have not explicitly included bounds on the prices, but this function
applies as long as the three terms in brackets each lie in the interval [0, 1].
By the same logic as the derivation for the monopoly case (1, 0; 0, 0), Firm A’s
profits from the first group are maximized when it sets PA,1 = V − β, and by the
same logic as the derivation for the standard Hotelling model, Firm A’s profits from
cA = β. All three objectives
the latter two groups are maximized when it sets PA,2 = P
can be accomplished simply by setting PA,1 = V − β and PA,2 = β.
Intuitively, the model set-up in which customers have either extreme format preferences or no preference between formats allows Firm A to perfectly price discriminate
by using its format 1 price to extract monopoly profits from those loyal to format
1, while using its format 2 price to set the optimal competitive price for all other
customers.
Because the model is symmetric across firms and formats, states (1, 1; 1, 0) and
(1, 0; 1, 1) are analogous to state (1, 1; 0, 1).
Finally, at state (1, 1; 1, 1), I will show there is an equilibrium in which both
firms set prices in both formats equal to β. Given Firm B’s price in the proposed
equilibrium, Firm A’s profits are:

πA = αPA,1

h1
2

+

h1 β − P i
h
ci
β − PA,1 i
A,2
cA 1 + β − PA (16)
+ αPA,2 +
+ (1 − 2α)P
2β
2
2β
2
2β

cA ≡ min{PA,1 , PA,2 }. By the same logic as the derivations for the standard
where P
Hotelling model, Firm A’s profits for all three groups of customers are maximized
cA = β. This can be accomplished simply by setting
if it sets PA,1 = PA,2 = P
PA,1 = PA,2 = β. Firm B’s best response is analogous to that of Firm A, so the
proposed equilibrium holds. QED
Proof of Lemma 1: A pure Markov strategy for Firm A is a mapping S A (Xt ) →
(eA,1 , eA,2 ) of the current state Xt into investment levels for each format. A pure
Markov strategy S B for Firm B is defined similarly. A pair of strategies (S A , S B ) is
an MPE if at each state each firm’s strategy is optimal given its competitor’s strategy.
In principle I allow for mixed strategies, but I will show that a pure strategy MPE
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exists.
The proof starts by deriving investment levels and value functions for state
(1, 1; 1, 1), and then works backwards, showing that for every state there exist
investment levels such that each firm is behaving optimally given its competitor’s
strategy at the current state and given continuation values at subsequent states.
Let ΛA
Xt denote Firm A’s value function at state Xt in an odd period (in which
A
Firm A invests), and ΛXt denote its value function in an even period (in which Firm
B invests). Similarly, ΛB
Xt denotes Firm B’s value function in an even period, and
B
ΛXt denotes Firm B’s value function in an odd period.
At state (1, 1; 1, 1), both firms have a dominant strategy of investing nothing
because investment has no effect on the state, which implies
ΛA
1,1;1,1
ΛB
1,1;1,1

=

A
Λ1,1;1,1

=

B
Λ1,1;1,1


=

=


1
πA
1 − δ 1,1;1,1

(17)


1
B
π1,1;1,1
1−δ

(18)

At state (1, 0; 1, 1), Firm B invests nothing because its investment has no effect
on the state, whereas Firm A sets eA,1 = 0 and chooses eA,2 to maximize its expected
discounted profits. We can write Firm A’s optimization problem at this state as:
(
ΛA
1,0;1,1 = max φ +
eA,2

∞
X



)
u+1 2u
A
1 − F (eA,2 )
(δ + δ 2u+1 )π(1,0;1,1)
+ δ 2u+2 φ

(19)

u=0

where we define:
i
h
A
A
φ ≡ −eA,2 + F (eA,2 ) π1,1;1,1
+ δΛ1,1;1,1

(20)

Intuitively, φ represents the cost of investment plus the probability of success in a
given period times the expected discounted profits that result from success. The first
term after the summation sign in (19) represents the probability of u + 1 failures in
A
a row. Each failure guarantees that the firm continues to earn profits π(1,0;1,1)
in the
current period and in the next period, and that in two periods the firm will invest
again and have another chance of success.


If we define emax ≡ exp(d/z) − 1 /d, by inserting this expression in (1), we see
that F (emax ) = 1. Therefore, no firm will ever choose investment above emax . Because
(19) is a continuous function maximized over a closed and bounded interval, [0, emax ],
the Extreme Value Theorem implies that this function obtains its maximum at some
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point e∗A,2 . Note the proposition does not claim equilibrium uniqueness, so there is
no need to show that this optimal point is unique, only that an optimum exists.
Similarly, at states (1, 1; 0, 1) and (1, 1; 1, 0), Firm A invests nothing while Firm B
chooses an investment level to maximize a function analogous to (19).
At state (1, 1; 0, 0), Firm A invests nothing, and Firm B chooses whether to invest
in Format 1 or 2. Given that the formats are symmetric, Firm B is indifferent between
these formats, and similar derivations to those above show there is an equilibrium in
which it invests in Format 2 at state (1, 1; 0, 0).
We now consider state (1, 0; 0, 1). At this state, each firm decides how much to
invest in the format it is not yet using; that is, Firm A chooses eA,2 , and Firm
B chooses eB,1 . In equilibrium, each firm’s strategy must be optimal given its
competitor’s strategy. In fact, I will show that each firm’s optimal investment level
at this state is weakly increasing in its competitor’s investment level (investments are
strategic complements), and therefore results from Vives (1990) guarantee existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium in investments at this state.
∗
eA
Define Λ
1,0;0,1 (eA,2 (eB,1 ), eB,1 ) as Firm A’s expected discounted profits starting at
state (1, 0; 0, 1) in an even period, if Firm B always invests eB,1 at this state, and if
Firm A always chooses the investment level e∗A,2 that is optimal given eB,1 . The proof
that e∗A,2 is weakly increasing in eB,1 proceeds in three steps.
A
eA
Step one is to show that Λ
1,0;0,1 ≥ Λ1,0;1,1 for all eB,1 . This can be proved as follows.
A
A
Because π1,0;0,1
> π1,0;1,1
, Firm A could always generate greater total discounted
profits by investing nothing at state (1, 0; 0, 1) until the state changes to (1, 0; 1, 1)
than it can if the game has already moved to state (1, 0; 1, 1). This implies that, when
Firm A optimizes, it must be better off at state (1, 0; 0, 1) than at state (1, 0; 1, 1).
eA
Step two is to show that Λ
1,0;0,1 is weakly decreasing in eB,1 . This can be proved
as follows. Suppose, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), Firm B always invests eH
B,1 and Firm A
∗
H
always chooses the investment level eA,2 (eB,1 ). Now suppose, during a single period
t, Firm B reduces its investment to some level eLB,1 < eH
B,1 . This lower investment
level decreases the probability of the game moving to state (1, 0; 1, 1) at time t. If
both firms then proceed with their original strategies, Firm B’s one-time investment
reduction increases Firm A’s expected discounted profits because, as noted above,
Firm A is better off at state (1, 0; 0, 1) than at state (1, 0; 1, 1). If the game is still at
state (1, 0; 0, 1) at time t + 2, and Firm B again invests eLB,1 instead of eH
B,1 , this again
increases Firm A’s expected discounted profits. By induction, if Firm B permanently
decreases its investment level at state to (1, 0; 0, 1) to eLB,1 , this must also increase
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eA
Firm A’s expected discounted profits. Thus, Firm A’s optimized value of Λ
1,0;0,1
L
H
must be greater for eB,1 than for eB,1 .
Step three is to show that e∗A,2 is weakly increasing in eB,1 . This can be proved
as follows. If Firm A chooses an optimal investment level e∗A,2 at the interior of the
interval [0, emax ], the following first-order condition must hold:
−1 + F

0

(e∗A,2 )



A
π1,1;0,1

−

A
π1,0;0,1



+δ



A
Λ1,1;0,1

−

∗
eA
Λ
1,0;0,1 (eA,2 (eB,1 ), eB,1 )



= 0 (21)

eA
We have shown that an increase in eB,1 causes Λ
1,0;0,1 to decrease, which implies that
the term in brackets in (21) increases. Given that F 0 is a decreasing function (F is
concave), e∗A,2 must also increase for (21) to continue to hold.
Intuitively, the more Firm B invests, the less attractive staying at state (1, 0; 0, 1)
is for Firm A, and therefore the more Firm A would like to invest in an effort to
leave this state and move to state (1, 1; 0, 1). By symmetry, analogous results hold
for Firm B. Because each firm chooses investment from the compact set [0, emax ]
and each firm’s optimal investment level at state (1, 0; 0, 1) is weakly increasing in
its competitor’s investment level, Tarski’s fixed point theorem (see Vives 1990, page
310) guarantees that a pair of strategies (e∗A,2 , e∗B,1 ) exist at this state, such that each
firm is behaving optimally given its competitor’s strategy.
At state (1, 0; 1, 0), both firms choose investment levels in the new format. Derivations similar to those for state (1, 0; 0, 1) show that each firm’s optimal investment
level is weakly increasing in its competitor’s investment level, which guarantees
existence of a pure strategy equilibrium.
Finally, at state (1, 0; 0, 0), Firm A chooses how much to invest in Format 2, while
Firm B decides where and how much to invest. Given the simplifying assumption
that a firm can only invest in one format at a time, Firm B will prefer to invest in
B
Format 1 if ΛB
1,0;1,0 > Λ1,0;0,1 and Format 2 otherwise. Once Firm B decides where
to invest, the same approach described above (for state (1, 0; 0, 1)) can be used to
show that investment levels are strategic complements, which guarantees existence of
a pure strategy equilibrium. QED
Proof of Proposition 1: I will show that as d → ∞, each firm’s investment level
converges to zero at every state; nonetheless, investment levels remain strictly positive
(even as they approach zero), guaranteeing that both firms eventually implement both
formats.
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In any Markov perfect equilibrium, at any time t, each firm’s investment decision
must be optimal given its value function in that equilibrium. For example, if Firm A
invests at time t at state (1, 0; 1, 1), then eA,2,t must maximize:





 A
A
A
A
−eA,2,t + F (eA,2,t ) π1,1;1,1 + δΛ1,1;1,1 + 1 − F (eA,2,t ) π(1,0;1,1) + δΛ1,0;1,1

(22)

The first derivative of (22) with respect eA,2,t to is:


A
A
A
A
−1 + F (eA,2,t ) π1,1;1,1 + δΛ1,1;1,1 − π(1,0;1,1) − δΛ1,0;1,1
0

(23)

From (2), we can see that, as d → ∞, F 0 (ei,j,t ) → 0 for and any ei,j,t > 0, which
implies that (23) converges to −1. In other words, for any given positive investment
level, once d becomes large enough, reducing investment increases a firm’s expected
discounted profits. Thus, optimal investment levels must approach zero as d → ∞.
Similar analysis implies that investment levels also approach zero at all other states.
As investment levels approach zero, the expected time spent at the current state
grows without bound, and the value for Firm i of being at any given state converges
to its expected discounted profits from remaining at this state forever:
ΛiXt
i
ΛXt


−→

d→∞


−→

d→∞


1
i
πX
t
1−δ

(24)


1
πi
1 − δ Xt

(25)

I now consider the marginal impact of investment at the point ei,j,t = 0. From
(2), we can see that
F 0 (0) = z

(26)

Inserting (24), (25), and (26) into (23) yields




1
A
A
−1 + z
π1,1;1,1 − π1,0;1,1
1−δ

(27)

Condition 1 guarantees that (27) is greater than zero. Thus, at state (1, 0; 1, 1), for
d sufficiently large, investing the first marginal dollar in Format 2 increases Firm A’s
expected discounted profits.
Similar analysis shows that Condition 1 guarantees, for any state at which a firm is
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not already using both formats, investing the first marginal dollar leads to an increase
in a firm’s expected discounted profits. This ensures that firms always make strictly
positive investment at any such state, which guarantees that in the long run they
both implement both formats. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: I will show that, under the conditions of the proposition,
there exists an equilibrium in which firms behave as follows: At states (1, 0; 1, 1),
(1, 1; 0, 1), and (1, 1; 1, 0), the firm that is not yet using both formats invests emax ≡


exp(d/z)−1 /d in the format it is not yet using, guaranteeing that it implements this
format immediately. At state (1, 1; 0, 0), Firm B invests emax in Format 2. At state
(1, 0; 0, 1), both firms invest nothing. At state (1, 0; 0, 0), Firm A invests nothing and
Firm B invests emax in Format 2. By the one-stage deviation principle, it is sufficient
to show that, if both firms follow these strategies, no firm can profitably deviate from
these strategies at any single time period t.
Given the proposed strategies, if Firm A invests at time t at state (1, 0; 1, 1), it
chooses eA,2,t to maximize:

i
h
A
2
A
−eA,2,t + F (eA,2,t )ΛA
+
1
−
F
(e
)
(1
+
δ)π
+
δ
−
e
+
Λ
(28)
A,2,t
max
1,1;1,1
1,0;1,1
1,1;1,1
where ΛA
1,1;1,1 =

A
π1,1;1,1
.
1−δ

Differentiating with respect to eA,2,t yields:

h


i
A
A
−1 + F 0 (eA,2,t ) (1 + δ) π1,1;1,1
− π1,0;1,1
+ δ 2 emax
As d → 0, emax →
(29) converges to:

1
z

(29)

and F 0 (e) → z for all e ∈ [0, emax ], which implies that expression


A
A
−1 + δ 2 + z(1 + δ) π1,1;1,1
− π1,0;1,1

(30)

Rearranging terms, this expression is greater than zero if:


 1−δ
A
A
π1,1;1,1
− π1,0;1,1
>
z

(31)

Condition 1 ensures that this inequality holds. Thus, for d sufficiently small,
expression (29) is positive over the interval [0, emax ], and so it is optimal for Firm
A to invest emax in Format 2 at state (1, 0; 1, 1). Similarly, it is optimal for Firm B
to invest emax in Format 1 at state (1, 1; 0, 1), and in Format 2 at state (1, 1; 1, 0).
Similar derivations also show that it is optimal for Firm B to invest emax in Format
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2 at state (1, 1; 0, 0).
We now consider state (1, 0; 0, 1). Given the proposed equilibrium, at this state
Firm A chooses eA,2,t to maximize:







δ
1
A
A
−eA,2,t + F (eA,2,t ) π1,1;0,1 +
π
+ 1 − F (eA,2,t )
πA
(32)
1 − δ 1,1;1,1
1 − δ 1,0;0,1
Differentiating with respect to eA,2,t , and noting that as d → 0 then F 0 (e) → z, yields:

−1 + z

A
π(1,1;0,1)

−

A
π(1,0;0,1)




−

δ
1−δ



A
π(1,0;0,1)

−

A
π(1,1;1,1)




(33)

Condition 2 is sufficient to ensure that this expression is less than zero, so Firm A’s
optimal strategy is to invest nothing at state (1, 0; 0, 1). Similarly, Firm B invests
nothing at this state.
The proof that Firm A invests nothing at state (1, 0; 0, 0) is similar. Given the
proposed equilibrium, implementing the new format would increase Firm A’s profits
in the short run, but would lead to lower long-run profits for Firm A because the
game would end up in state (1, 1; 1, 1) instead of state (1, 0; 0, 1). Considering both
effects, Condition 2 is sufficient to ensure that Firm A invests nothing at the initial
state.
The only remaining question is what Firm B does at the initial state. Given
B
B
, and given that Firm A invests nothing at state (1, 0; 0, 1),
> π(1,0;1,0)
that π(1,0;0,1)
regardless of how much Firm A invests at state (1, 0; 1, 0), it can be shown that
B
ΛB
1,0;0,1 > Λ1,0;1,0 . Therefore, Firm B prefers to invest in Format 2 at the initial state.
Derivations similar to those in expressions (28) through (31) show that it is optimal
for Firm B to invest emax in this format. QED
Proof of Proposition 3: I will first show that both firms make zero investment
at all states except the initial state. If Firm A invests at time t at state (1, 0; 1, 1), it
chooses eA,2,t to maximize (22). The derivative of this expression is


A
A
A
A
−1 + F (eA,2,t ) π1,1;1,1 + δΛ1,1;1,1 − π(1,0;1,1) − δΛ1,0;1,1
0

A

Note that F 0 ≤ z, and Λ1,1;1,1 =

A
π1,1;1,1
.
1−δ

(34)

Also, when Firm A is optimizing, we must

A
πA
have Λ1,0;1,1 ≥ 1,0;1,1
because Firm A could invest nothing at this state and generate
1−δ
A
profits π1,0;1,1 forever. Substituting in these values, we see that (34) is less than or
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equal to:

−1 + z



1
A
A
π1,1;1,1 − π1,0;1,1
1−δ

(35)

Condition 4 guarantees that this expression is less than zero, which implies that (34)
is also negative for all eA,2,t ≥ 0, and it is optimal for Firm A to invest nothing at
state (1, 0; 1, 1). Similar derivations show that, under Condition 4, Firm B invests
nothing at states (1, 1; 0, 1), (1, 1; 1, 0), and (1, 1; 0, 0).
At states (1, 0; 0, 1) and (1, 0; 1, 0), each firm’s optimal investment level could theoretically depend on its competitor’s investment level. However, slight modifications
to the above derivations show that, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), Condition 4 guarantees each
firm’s optimal strategy is to invest nothing regardless of its competitor’s investment
choice at this state. Similarly, Condition 3 guarantees it is optimal to invest nothing
at state (1, 0; 1, 0).
The only remaining question is what happens at the initial state (1, 0; 0, 0).
B
B
, Firm B clearly prefers to invest in Format 2. The question
> π1,0;1,0
Because π1,0;0,1
is how much it invests, and how much (if anything) Firm A also invests in Format 2.
When d is sufficiently large, I will show that only Firm B makes positive investment in the new format. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. As
d → ∞, optimal investment levels approach zero. This implies that Firm i’s value
 i
1
function at state Xt approaches 1−δ
πXt , and so a firm will only invest in a format if
successfully implementing the format increases its profits by at least 1−δ
. Condition 5
z
guarantees that the profit increase when Firm B moves from state (1, 0; 0, 0) to state
(1, 0; 0, 1) exceeds this value, while Condition 3 guarantees that the profit increase
for Firm A when it moves from state (1, 0; 0, 0) to state (1, 1; 0, 0) is less than this
value. Therefore, the entrant makes positive investment in the new format until it
eventually implements this format, while the incumbent makes no investment.
When d is sufficiently small, I will first show that Firm B has a dominant strategy
of investing emax in Format 2.
If Firm B invests at time t at state (1, 0; 0, 0), it chooses eB,2,t to maximize





 B
B
B
B
−eB,2,t + F (eB,2,t ) π1,0;0,1 + δΛ1,0;0,1 + 1 − F (eB,2,t ) π(1,0;0,0) + δΛ1,0;0,0

(36)

The first derivative of this expression is


B
B
B
B
−1 + F (eB,2,t ) π1,0;0,1 + δΛ1,0;0,1 − π(1,0;0,0) − δΛ1,0;0,0
0
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(37)

Recall that Firm B generates zero profits at states (1, 0; 0, 0) and (1, 1; 0, 0), and
given the conditions of this proposition, it makes no investment at state (1, 1; 0, 0).
Therefore, Firm B earns zero profits if Firm A implements the new format and moves
the state to (1, 1; 0, 0), and regardless of Firm A’s investment level at state (1, 0; 0, 0),
B
it must be true that Λ1,0;0,0 ≤ δΛB
1,0;0,0 . Therefore, (37) is greater than or equal to



B
B
2
B
B
−1 + F (eB,2,t ) π1,0;0,1 + δπ1,0;0,1 + δ Λ1,0;0,1 − Λ1,0;0,0
0

(38)

I will show that, for d sufficiently small, Firm B invests emax . It suffices to show
there is no profitable deviation at any time t. For the proposed investment level, Firm
B is guaranteed to implement the new format immediately the first time it invests,
1
B
0
which implies ΛB
1,0;0,1 − Λ1,0;0,0 = emax . As d → 0, emax → z and F (eB,2,t ) → z for
eB,2,t ∈ [0, emax ]. Inserting these values into (38) yields:
B
−1 + δ 2 + zπ1,0;0,1
(1 + δ)

(39)

Condition 5 guarantees that this expression is greater than zero, which implies that
(37) must be greater than zero over the interval [0, emax ], and it is optimal for Firm B
to invest emax at time t. Note that (37) being strictly positive implies investing emax
 B
1
is the unique optimal solution that achieves the value ΛB
1,0;0,0 = −emax + 1−δ π1,0;0,1 .
We have shown that, at state (1, 0; 0, 0), Firm B has a dominant strategy of
investing emax in the new format, regardless of how much Firm A invests. I now show
that Firm A’s best response at this state is also to invest emax in the new format.
Given Firm B’s strategy, if Firm A invests at time t at state (1, 0; 0, 0), it maximizes:







1
δ
A
A
A
−eA,2,t + F (eA,2,t )
π
+ 1 − F (eA,2,t ) π1,0;0,0 +
π
(40)
1 − δ 1,1;0,0
1 − δ 1,0;0,1
Differentiating with respect to eA,2,t , and noting that as d → 0, F 0 (eA,2,t ) → z yields
the following for eA,2,t ∈ [0, emax ]:




δ
A
A
A
A
π1,1;0,0 − π1,0;0,1
−1 + z π1,1;0,0 − π1,0;0,0 +
1−δ

(41)

Condition 5 ensures that this expression is positive, so that Firm A’s optimal strategy
is to set eA,2,t = emax . Thus, when d is sufficiently small, each firm invests emax in
the new format, and whichever firm moves first implements this format. Firms then
make no further investment. QED
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Proof of Proposition 4: The proofs that Firm B does not invest in Format 1
at states (1, 1; 0, 1) and (1, 0; 0, 1) are the same as the analogous proofs from Proposition 3. In particular, under Condition 6, the incremental profits to Firm B if
it moves from state (1, 1; 0, 1) to state (1, 1; 1, 1) are less than 1−δ
, so it makes no
z
investment at this state. Also, under Condition 6 the incremental profits to Firm B
from being at state (1, 0; 1, 1) instead of state (1, 1; 0, 1) are less than 1−δ
, so Firm B
z
invests nothing in Format 1 at state (1, 0; 0, 1), even if it knows Firm A will then
immediately implement Format 2.
On the other hand, at state (1, 0; 0, 1), Condition 1 guarantees that the incremental
, and so Firm A
profits to Firm A from implementing Format 2 are greater than 1−δ
z
makes positive investment at this state. Similarly, Condition 1 guarantees that Firm
A invests in Format 2 at state (1, 0; 1, 0), and that Firm B invests in Format 2 at
state (1, 1; 0, 0).
Finally, at least one firm must make positive investment in Format 2 at state
(1, 0; 0, 0) because, given the equilibrium investment behavior at subsequent states
described above, either firm can guarantee a permanent profit increase of at least 1−δ
z
by implementing this format. Also note that Condition 6 guarantees Firm B would
never invest in Format 1 (the old format with the fixed expense) at this state because
the incremental profits from doing so are less than 1−δ
. QED
z
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Proof of Proposition 5: As shown in the following table, this proposition assumes
a different equilibrium profit function than the previous results.
Table 3. Equilibrium Profits When the New Format
Eliminates Profits in the Old Format
State

Firm A’s profits

Firm B’s profits

(1, 0; 0, 0)

(V − β)(1 − α)

0

(1, 1; 0, 0)

(V − β)(1 − α)

0

(1, 0; 0, 1)

0

(V − β)(1 − α)

(1, 0; 1, 0)

β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

(1, 1; 0, 1)

β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

(1, 1; 1, 0)

(V − β)(1 − α)

0

(1, 0; 1, 1)

0

(V − β)(1 − α)

(1, 1; 1, 1)

β(1 − α) 12

β(1 − α) 21

The first part of this proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. As d → ∞,
optimal investment levels approach zero. This implies that Firm i’s value function at
 i
1
state Xt approaches 1−δ
πXt , and so Firm i makes positive investment in Format j
if and only if successfully implementing Format j increases its profits by at least 1−δ
.
z
Under Condition 1, and using the modified profit functions in Table 3, the profit
when Firm B invests in Format
increase from implementing a new format exceeds 1−δ
z
2 to move from state (1, 0; 0, 0) to state (1, 0; 0, 1) or from state (1, 1; 0, 0) to state
(1, 1; 0, 1), and when Firm A invests in Form 2 to move from state (1, 0; 0, 1) to
state (1, 1; 0, 1), but not in any other case. Therefore, the entrant makes positive
investment in the new format at the initial state, and with probability one it eventually
implements this format; the incumbent then begins investing in the new format until
it too eventually implements this format. QED
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